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ABSTRACT
Indigenous peoples in major common law jurisdictions (Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) have had a fraught
relationship with the state’s legal system. However, while denying
Indigenous individuals and peoples the same rights as white settlers, each
of these states used Indigenous art to create a distinctive national-state
identity. We analyze four major exhibitions, one from each of these
countries to de-naturalize legal institutions responsible for the oppression
of Indigenous people. This agenda-setting, comparative legal analysis
yields valuable insights for the regulation of the contemporary Indigenous
art market, and to understand how culture makes legal personality.
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background norms; exhibitions; legal personality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout most of the 20th century, Indigenous peoples in major
common law jurisdictions (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United States) have had complex if not fraught relationships to each state’s
legal system.1 At various times, these states did not recognize Indigenous
individuals and peoples as having access to the same rights as white
settlers. And yet, as we explore here, Indigenous art played a role in statebuilding and the cultivation of distinctive national-state identities. We
examine four international exhibitions, which were used to showcase the
distinctive art as ‘belonging to’ the nation-state and, in doing so, suggest
plausible narratives of distinct national identities. As we explore here, there
were key tensions with showcasing these arts. These exhibitions, in their
promotion and co-option of Indigenous art for national identity-building
produced questions about the identification of rights holders and the
originality of Indigenous art as “art” that influenced broader debates about
the legal recognition of Indigenous peoples in those four countries.
The international and comparative regulation of Indigenous art is a
fruitful yet un(der)explored space where Indigenous identities, recognition,
and rights are negotiated, often through background norms.2 Critical
(international) legal scholars have sought to articulate the importance of
background norms through the interrelation of public international law to
private law.3 In articulating the ‘background norms’, they target a ‘common
sense’ approach to law and the market. This common-sense approach
maintains the idea that, broadly, government is man-made and the market is
natural and spontaneous order of human exchange.4 For critical legal
scholars, that view obscures multiple debates and issues worth
interrogating, which is why they seek to bring the ‘background norms’ to
the foreground.5 Where some believe that the market is a naturally and
spontaneously occurring phenomenon and that law or international law
1. Kristy Gover, Settler–State Political Theory, ‘CANZUS’ and the UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 26 (2) EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 345 (2015).
2. Terri Janke & R Quiggin, Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property: The Main
Issues for the Indigenous Arts Industry in 2006, ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER
ARTS BOARD, AUSTRALIA COUNCIL (2006).
3. David W. Kennedy, A New World Order: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 4
TRANSNAT’L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 330, 370-72 (1994).
4. Id. at 372.
5. Alan Audi, A Semiotics of Cultural Property Argument, 14 INT’L J. CULTURAL
PROP. 131 (2007). For non-art related context that reads legality into the creation of markets
(and its crises), see ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 82-123 (Cambridge University Press
2003).
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must catch-up to constrain its excesses,6 that style of narration obscures the
legal processes in creating the conditions, contingencies, and social
relations of the market.7 Accordingly, the supposed ‘excesses’ of the
marketplace are part and parcel of that legal construction.
Narrative styles that maintain and reproduce these background norms
do important work in shaping the realm of possibilities for broader
recognition efforts through law. We take the regulation of Indigenous art
seriously not only to understand the background norms and stakes of
recognition, but also to better appreciate the interlinking of law with
economic domains that are manifested in the art market. More specifically,
our analysis shows that state-based legal regulation of Indigenous art has
never been static. The legal regulations of and for Indigenous art became
more important as states emerged from empire and formalized themselves
to extend their own territories and boundaries. Similarly, the categorization
of objects that are considered ‘art’ is flexible and dynamic. At first,
Indigenous or ‘native’ objects were categorized as something other than
‘art’, but they were important and useful in forming national identities in
support of the formalizations of the nation-state. As states emerged from
colonies and through domains, classification involved (re)producing the
category of art as applicable to Indigenous objects. The increasing
formalization of state law then discursively produces the background norms
for commodification of these art-objects as well as identities, in terms of
claims to an ‘authentic self’ and national-identities for the nation-state and
Indigenous nations.
We argue that the formalization of state boundaries reveals that
employing legal frameworks for directly addressing and protecting
Indigenous artists and art will continue to be dynamic, fraught, contested
and limiting. Turning to national and international legal regimes to contain
the so-called excesses of the marketplace maintains and reproduces a
narrative style about background norms while it produces debates and
contests, including: whether Indigenous objects are art or artefact,
recognized or assimilated, dependent on state patronage versus exercising
self-determination, or pathways to identity, capacity and rights. Rather than
solve or fix these issues, legal regimes narrow the field of contestation to
legitimate discourses that perpetuate background norms, so this winnowed
6. Neoliberals, like Friedrich A. von Hayek advocated for spontaneous ordering and
market-based freedoms that required and depended on rights and the rule of law. See
JESSICA WHYTE, THE MORALS OF THE MARKET: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RISE OF
NEOLIBERALISM, 19-203 (2019); see also FREDRICH A. VON HAYEK, L AW, LEGISLATION AND
LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL
ECONOMY 35-54 (1998).
7. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 372.
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range of debates remain contested. Those legal contests, however, are
valuable. They produce the opportunities for more legal claims, claims to
authenticity, identity, and nation as well as a range of economic
opportunities and they obscure any debate about the role of legality in
constructing the market and those problems.
We make this argument through examining four major exhibitions,
one in each of these four common law countries: the 1906 New Zealand
International Exhibition in Christchurch, which curated the notion of
‘Maoriland’ that combined the Pākehā (non-Māori, white, person) salvage
mentality and a genuine Māori concern to preserve and maintain their
cultural heritage; the 1927 Exposition d’Art Canadienne at the Jeu de
Palme Museum in Paris, which highlighted the incongruousness of legally
protecting art and artists in contexts where cultural practices were
otherwise legally forbidden; the 1939 San Francisco World’s Fair, which
promoted Indian Arts to demonstrate Indian economic independence as a
marker of their civilization; and the 1988 touring exhibition Dreamings:
The Art of Aboriginal Australia that cemented domestic recognition efforts
through appeals to international audiences and international legal discourse.
This is an agenda-setting article: additional research is needed because
the case studies only offer snapshots of imperial workings and
reproduction. The exhibitions on which we focus happened at different
times over the course of the 20th century, meaning we need to deal not only
with different countries, but also different moments in the international
Indigenous movement, and different points of the state of the art with
respect to scientific racism and colonialism. As a result, our account is
more comparable to vignettes than a fully realized linear narrative. That is a
fair possible objection to this article.
Nonetheless, we deal with this objection by accounting for those
differences in discourse to highlight different modes of engagement while
resisting linear narratives of progress.8 That is also a reason why we
structure our discussion of these exhibitions in chronological order.
Further, these snapshots enable a much more comprehensive sense of the
direction of legal argument on Indigenous rights seen through the
perspective of Indigenous art than would otherwise be possible.
Further, and vitally, we are both non-Indigenous scholars, meaning
our positioning in the discussion of these themes is complicated by our own

8. We highlight the role of a linear narrative of progress, but not for the purposes of
supporting it. For a discussion of the role of these narratives in legal argument, see Tilmann
Altwicker & Oliver Diggelmann, How is Progress Constructed in International Legal
Scholarship?, 25(2) EUR. J. INT’L L. 425 (2014).
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non-Indigenous (and settler colonial) positionalities.9 Nevertheless, our
position as insiders to the colonial legal order we seek to critique and
unravel is also useful for understanding and articulating the role of law, and
we do not seek to replace Indigenous voices and claims with our own.
Instead, we wish to bring background norms forward to scrutinize ongoing
colonial formations, which is necessary for Indigenous peoples to better
position their own legalities.
Despite these limitations, this article offers significant benefits that
might not be otherwise attainable. Our comparative historical and legal
analysis de-naturalizes legal institutions responsible for the oppression of
Indigenous peoples. Further, our comparison of these four jurisdictions
fosters legal innovation by yielding valuable insights for the regulation of
the contemporary (Indigenous) art market, as well as for understanding
how culture (and cultural history with it) is interrelated to the making of
legal personality, which continue to be contested grounds for rights
recognition battles.10 However, we ultimately conclude that further research
in this area is warranted, especially research attentive to international and
comparative colonial legalities.
We intervene in comparative law more broadly by de-localizing
settler-Indigenous experiences.11 While a common assumption, particularly
connected to certain readings of cultural anthropology, is that experiences
are unique, culturally contingent, and we should not be too quick to
generalize them,12 a comparative analysis provides a broader vantage point,
especially for understanding the role of law and legality as processes of
abstraction.13 That is to say, we seek to draw attention to the processes of
legal abstraction arising from background norms that would be occluded,
obfuscated or ignored in detailed analysis of a singular, particular and
localized account. When it comes to the settler states we examine, each
state derived from a British colonial project which engaged with
9. For a discussion of positionality, see Celina Carter et al., Explicating Positionality:
A Journey of Dialogical and Reflexive Storytelling, INT’L J. QUALITATIVE METHODS 362
(2014).
10. JONAS BENS, THE INDIGENOUS PARADOX: RIGHTS, SOVEREIGNTY, AND CULTURE IN
THE AMERICAS (2020); see generally STEPHEN YOUNG, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, CONSENT AND
RIGHTS: TROUBLING SUBJECTS (2020).
11. For a recent example of this type of intervention in history, see Jane Carey & Ben
Silverstein, Thinking With and Beyond Settler Colonial Studies: New Histories after the
Postcolonial, 23 POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES 1 (2020).
12. This discussion dates to the origins of cultural anthropology. For a recent account,
see CHARLES KING, THE REINVENTION OF HUMANITY: HOW A CIRCLE OF RENEGADE
ANTHROPOLOGISTS REMADE RACE, SEX AND GENDER (2020).
13. Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature:
A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613 (1986).
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Indigenous peoples based on the same premise – the want to expand of
empire. However, colonialists engaged with Indigenous peoples in different
places and times and faced local differences and resistances.14 Second,
Indigenous movements are themselves internationalized, meaning they
often share strategies across national boundaries.15 Finally, the scientific
racism against which these internationalized Indigenous rights movements
operate does not respect national boundaries nor cultural specificities of
Indigenous peoples, responding instead to colonial projects and discourses
that are far more internationalized.16 We do not mean to engage with these
issues only from the perspective of colonial law and categories, of course,
or to applaud colonialism or de-emphasize resistance. Instead, we seek to
draw further attention to the background norms against which Indigenous
recognition, especially through law, operates. In other words, we speak of
the localized operation of recognition efforts against colonial structures that
were becoming globalized, and there is thus much to be gained from
learning and borrowing strategies from different contexts.
The article proceeds as follows: the next section provides four
snapshots of exhibitions, using those events to query the basic legal
categories. Based on those snapshots, section three pulls together the
analytical threads that arise from our analysis of these exhibitions to
indicate the potentials of a broader research agenda on the regulation of
Indigenous art. We conclude with a call for additional research in this area.

II. INDIGENOUS ART AND THE (UN)MAKING OF RIGHTS HOLDERS
A. NEW ZEALAND 1906: WHITE SALVAGE AND INDIGENOUS
PRESERVATION
At the Christchurch International Exhibition 1906-07, the New
Zealand government funded the creation of a Māori model pā. This pā,
named Araiteuru, was a life-size replica of a Māori “stockaded village of
the olden times” that was constructed specifically for the Exhibition. 17

14. STUART BANNER, POSSESSING THE PACIFIC: LAND, SETTLERS, AND INDIGENOUS
PEOPLE FROM AUSTRALIA TO ALASKA, 455 (2007).
15. KAREN ENGLE, THE ELUSIVE PROMISE OF INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT: RIGHTS,
CULTURE, STRATEGY (Duke University Press) (2010).
16. KING, supra note 12.
17. J. COWAN, OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION OF
ARTS AND INDUSTRIES HELD AT CHRISTCHURCH, 1906-07: A DESCRIPTIVE AND HISTORICAL
ACCOUNT 310 (John Mackay, Government Printer (1910). See also, Simonccl, 110 years
ago: The 1906 New Zealand International Exhibition (Nov. 2, 2016)
https://my.christchurchcitylibraries.com/blogs/post/110-years-ago-the-1906-new-zealandinternational-exhibition/.
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Within this ersatz village, Māori were exhibited, and they exhibited
themselves, to an imperial or colonial gaze. They showcased their skills,
talents, and taonga (anything prized including socially and culturally
valuable objects, resources, phenomenon, ideas, and techniques). Through
bodily acts and displaying taonga, they performed in ways that did not
always conform to colonial expectations. These skillful performances and
acts of display arrived at a time and place that helped cultivate broader
appreciation for Māori art as art. It also helped Aotearoa New Zealand
forge a distinct national identity within the British Empire through the
promotion of a romanticized and mythic place, ‘Maoriland’.
This exhibition reveals an interlinking of empires, identities,
authenticity, and market. At the beginning of the 20th century, New Zealand
was a British colony. The staging of the Christchurch International
Exhibition 1906-07 reflects that colonial status in an ambiguous way. At
one level, the New Zealand government staged the Exhibition to forge a
distinct national identity as it transitioned from colony to self-governing
dominion, while at the same time claiming the moniker “Britain of the
South” and announcing fealty to Empire and Britishness.18 At another,
Māori staged themselves, as others staged them, within the Exhibition in
ways that demonstrate similar tensions of independence and fealty,
particularly around promoting distinctive (national) identity within “the
kingdom under the mana (prestige, reputation, authority, power) of which
we live.”19 Māori and Pākehā promoted these identities by establishing
their material progress, advancement and industriousness as part of a
civilizing narrative.20 In relation to the rest of the Exhibition, Araiteuru
promoted a vision of ‘Maoriland’ so Māori and Pākehā could stage distinct
national identities.
The Exhibition’s Main Building was dedicated to the products of the
British Empire. Within it, as an example, Auckland displayed former
colonial governor and premier Sir George Grey’s “large collection of
Maori artefacts.”21 They were not displayed as art. As a reflection of

18. Jock Phillips, Exhibiting Ourselves: The Exhibition and National Identity,
FAREWELL COLONIALISM: THE NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION CHRISTCHURCH,
1906-07 21-2 (John M. Thomson ed., 1998); Bernard Kernot, Imaging the Nation: The New
Zealand International Exhibition 1906-07 and the Model Maori Pa, ART AND
PERFORMANCE IN OCEANIA 37 (Barry Craig, Bernard Kernot and Christopher Anderson eds.,
1999).
19. Margaret Orbell, Maori writing about the Exhibition, FAREWELL COLONIALISM, 148,
citing Te Pīpīwharauroa no. 104 (November 1906).
20. Phillips, supra note 18.
21. Gavin McLean, The Colony Commodified: Trade, Progress and the Real Business
of Exhibitions, FAREWELL COLONIALISM: THE NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION
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Empire, the Art Gallery connected to the Main Building housed the British
Art Exhibit, excluding Māori art. The exhibition was commercially
unsuccessful (it lost money), but it was symbolically important and
materially impactful in leaving “its mark on most of our [New Zealand’s]
public collections,”22 underscoring a division between European settler and
Indigenous forms of art production.
After 1900, the economic engine of international exhibitions was not
education, commerce or propaganda – it was entertainment and
consumption.23 The Exhibition’s entertainment included a “Wonderland,”
with its “Space ship”; the country’s first water-chute; the “Katzejammer
Castle”; and a 375-foot long cyclorama of the “Battle of Gettysburg.”24
Directly next to this ‘fun-fair’ was Araiteuru, part of the ‘amusements’.25
This ‘entertainment’ feature helped solidify the notion that Māori produced
art in sophisticated ways that were, importantly, authentic and proof of
being recognized as civilized.
The idea for Araiteuru was imported from the United States. Secretary
of the Department of Tourist and Health Reports, T.E. Donne convinced
the New Zealand Government to construct a model Māori pā after viewing
the model villages of Native American tribes and Filipino Islanders at the
1904 St Louis World’s Fair.26 The St Louis World’s Fair displayed model
villages of the tribes within the US’s growing empire along a scale of low
to high civilization that supposedly demonstrated a social Darwinist
evolution of historical progress.27 By contrast, Araiteuru, presented
romanticized “colonial images of a mythic Maoriland.” 28 That was not
because Māori or Pākehā disagreed with this civilizational narrative, but
both Māori and Pākehā involved in constructing Araiteuru saw Māori as
relatively high on the civilizations scale.29 If old and backwards
superstitions were dying out, that was welcomed.30 Māori, however, were
CHRISTCHURCH, supra note 18, at 33.
22. Linda Tyler, Art For Empire: Paintings in the British Art Exhibit, FAREWELL
COLONIALISM: THE NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION CHRISTCHURCH, supra note
18, at 104.
23. A Māori visitor of the exhibition, Reweti Kohere noted the ‘fine’ pā but identified
the entertainment and educational features. Orbell, supra note 19, at 149-60.
24. McLean, supra note 21, at 32-3.
25. Phillips, supra note 18, at 23; Cowan, supra note 17, at 5.
26. Kernot, supra note 18, at 38.
27. Id., at 39.
28. Id.
29. Banner, supra note 14; see also MPK Sorrenson, How to Civilize Savages: Some
‘Answers’ from Nineteenth-Century New Zealand, 9(2) N.Z. J. HIST. 97 (1975).
30. NEW ZEALAND, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT 133 (1908).
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becoming modern civilized. Having identified the category of ‘art’ as
important civilizational marker, Māori could revitalize those traditions to
establish that their civilizational credentials.
The New Zealand Government funded Araiteuru and placed it under
the management of the Minister for Native Affairs James Carroll (Timi
Kara of Ngāti Kahungunu) and a “Maori Committee.”31 Caroll appointed
Augustus Hamilton as Māori Committee leader, two Pākehā and two Māori
members, Sir Peter Buck and Henry Uru.32 Despite the Committee’s
oversight, Pākehā intellectuals interested in ethnography managed the
construction and design of the pā to “convey the semi-barbaric life and
colour that the builders imagined Pa life to have been.”33 As a fantastical
re-imagination of pre-colonial Māori life, it was a representation of
‘Maoriland’ that combined “a display of Māori taonga as well as Pakeha
salvage.”34 This fictionalized Maoriland supported the notion that Aotearoa
New Zealand was a land of opportunity, industry and harmonious
relationships between British and Māori. Although not within the Main
Building, Araiteuru was centrally important to Aotearoa New Zealand’s
burgeoning national identity.
For some, Pākehā saw Araiteuru, and Maoriland more broadly, as an
imperial appropriation of Māori cultural materials to help “ameliorate a
sense of alienation from a lost motherland” and “build a local literary
tradition and a sense of national identity.”35 Kernot writes that Maoriland
was “both a romanticized world of the European imagination and an
acknowledgement of their own cultural displacement in an alien place,
coupled with the recognition of the Maori presence as being the more
authentic.”36 Pākehā of that time promoted and exploited Māori images to
support the notion of assimilation into the British Empire. This colonial

31. Kernot, supra note 18, at 39. Please note that we have updated spelling of proper
nouns to reflect current use of macrons but preserve original spelling and lack of macrons
within quotations.
32. Id.
33. Kernot, supra note 18, at 39 (citing Cowan, supra note 17, at 312).
34. CONAL MCCARTHY, EXHIBITING MĀORI: A HISTORY OF COLONIAL CULTURES OF
DISPLAY 59 (2007).
35. Bernard Kernot, Maoriland Metaphors and the Modern Pa, FAREWELL
COLONIALISM: THE NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITION, CHRISTCHURCH, supra note
18, at 61-2 (1998); (citing Jock Phillips, Musing in Maoriland – or was there a Bulletin
school in New Zealand?) 20 AUSTL. HIST. STUD. 520, 528 (1983); ROGER NEICH, JACOBI
WILLIAM HEBERLEY OF WELLINGTON: A MAORI CARVER IN A CHANGED WORLD’, 69, 144
(Records Of The Auckland Institute And Museum, 1991).
36. Kernot, supra, note 18, at 63; Conal McCarthy “Our Works of Ancient Times”:
History, Colonization, and Agency at the 1906-7 New Zealand International Exhibition, 2
MUSEUM HIST. J. 119, 137 (2009).

Winter 2021

INDIGENOUS ARTISTS AND THE LAW

13

double-movement creates distinctiveness and difference (exclusion) for the
purposes of inclusion and assimilation through sameness. The construction
of a distinctive national identity, perhaps in tension with empire, shows the
importance of New Zealand and Māori assimilation and progress for
Empire. Part of this project was to promote and exhibit Māori imagery,
skills, and their ‘authenticity’ as worthy of being art. As McCarthy argues,
Māori did not have a word for art, but through this Exhibition and others
like it “Māori “art” was produced through the colonial culture of display.”37
Objects that Māori highly valued were promoted and accepted within the
imperial categorization of ‘art,’ which those constructing Araiteuru
promoted.
For instance, before leading the Māori Committee for Araiteuru,
August Hamilton published articles from 1896 to 1900 that were compiled
into a book called Māori Art. He was the “best known Pakeha advocate of
the artistic qualities of Māori culture.”38 He became director of the Colonial
Museum in 1903 and “launched a concerted buying campaign” to display
Māori art. He publicly recommended that the basic patterns of “Maori
decorative art” be applied to architecture and everyday objects so that it
became “a national characteristic” and a “memorial to the race who created
and developed it.”39 Hamilton saw Araiteuru as a means of furthering this
national identity by cultivated broad and imperial appreciation of Māori art
as art. Accordingly, some criticize Hamilton for using Māori for his own
ends, while others argue that he was also “used by Māori” and “his work
indisputably earned him respect of Māori.”40
Māori used the Exhibition as “an opportunity to enhance their mana
and define a place for themselves within the colonial order.”41 McCarthy
writes that Māori “participated enthusiastically” in the creation of and life
within the pā.42 McCarthy reveals some contemporary effects of a colonial
double-movement: where the colonized subject’s agency is acknowledged
they can be identified as “enthusiastically” participating in acts that
contribute to empire-building (even if it is to advance their own purposes),
while highlighting the structural imposition of imperialism would undercut
their agency.

37.
38.
39.
40.

McCarthy, supra note 34, at 46.
Id.
Id. at 46-7 (citing ANX TO 1, 1901 162/20 (1901)).
Conal McCarthy, Before “Te Maori”: A revolution deconstructed, MUSEUM
REVOLUTIONS: HOW MUSEUMS CHANGE AND ARE CHANGED, 129 (Simon Knell et al., eds.,
2007).
41. McCarthy, supra note 36, at 125.
42. Id. at 126, 130-32.
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While Pākehā used Maoriland to overcome alienation, Māori
approached Araiteuru in a similar way. Life for Māori in Aotearoa New
Zealand in the early 20th century was “a real world of bitter struggle at the
center of which was the possession of Maori land.”43 After 1840,44 the
colonial government began a systematic process of land alienation through
legal mechanisms.45 These were socially deleterious and economically
costly acts that dispossessed Māori of land.46 In 1901, New Zealand passed
laws to protect Māori ‘antiquities’ and created a Department of Tourist and
Health Resorts, which made New Zealand into “the first nation in the world
dedicated to the marketing and development of its natural and cultural
resources.”47 Other laws criminalized Māori healing practices involving
“superstition,” “supernatural powers,” and “foretelling the future,” which
also helped allay “Pākehā fears about Māori attempts to claw back some
political power.”48 Araiteuru became an opportunity to re-establish or
cultivate a national identity through revitalized, but sterilized, nonsuperstitious or non-supernatural cultural practices within this “side show.”
Māori involved in the construction, carvings, and performances of
Araiteuru “mounted a spirited cultural revival by redeploying ethnographic
constructions of their “traditional past.”49 It was also an opportunity for
“important chiefs who reveled in the opportunity for interchange and
rivalry” to “discuss issues important to the politics of the day” and “present
themselves advantageously in an international context.”50 Araiteuru
contained fantastical aspects, like mock battles, but “rather than living out
Pakeha ethnographic fantasies, Māori made them a reality by taking
seriously the artifacts, activities and ceremonies, which Pakeha spectators
thought were just for show.”51 Māori closed it to the public for private
functions, lived on the pā, hosted visitors, met with and exchanged
43. McCarthy, supra note 36, at 128 (citing Kernot, supra note 35, at 77).
44. British colonists entered Te Tiriti o Waitangi/the Treaty of Waitangi with Māori
iwi. For a detailed history, see Claudia Orange, THE TREATY OF WAITANGI (1987).
45. Native Lands Act of 1862; Native Lands Act of 1865.
46. Banner, supra note 14; Richard Boast et al., MĀORI LAND LAW 49-50, 61-80 (1999).
See also JAMES BELICH, THE NEW ZEALAND WARS AND THE VICTORIAN INTERPRETATION OF
RACIAL CONFLICT (2013).
47. Dennis Lance Foley, From Traditional Carving to Plastic Tiki: Māori Struggles to
Balance Commerce and Culture within the Global Tourism Marketplace, 1860-2010, 3 J.
TOUR. HIST. 177, 179-80 (2011).
48. Tohunga Suppression Act 1907, preamble; see Māmari Stephens, A Return to the
Tohunga Suppression Act 1907, 32 VICTORIA UNIV. WELLINGTON L. REV. 437 (2001).
49. McCarthy, supra note 36, at 125
50. Kernot, supra note 18, at 46; Amiria Henare, MUSEUMS, ANTHROPOLOGY AND
IMPERIAL EXCHANGE, 220 (2005).
51. McCarthy, supra note 36, at 137.

Winter 2021

INDIGENOUS ARTISTS AND THE LAW

15

genealogical information with Cook Islanders, and revived interest in their
arts.52 Their arts and performances were made anew, and often they did not
conform to Hamilton’s visions of Māori traditionalism.
Araiteuru played a role in forming Aotearoa New Zealand’s national
identities and Māori arts. The role that it played is a small part of a larger
story about the multiple interlinking and overlapping trajectories of
imperialism, civilization, and commodification. In one sense, the idea of
model villages had been imported from the United States, which had
become its own empire. Through Araiteuru, the Government of New
Zealand promoted and cultivated a distinct national identity through the
assimilation of Māori art, motifs, and bodies within empire.
Simultaneously, the formation of Araiteuru enabled Māori to work with
Pākehā and within Government to revitalize their arts and projects and
connect with Cook Islanders and others within the empire.
Being simultaneously in the exhibition and (co-)managing it meant
that Māori had some control over how they were displayed. This level of
agency, albeit key in both narrational and regulatory engagements with
Indigenous art and artists, was not available to Indigenous artists in other
contexts. Elsewhere, Indigenous art was meant to serve discrete nationmaking objectives for the benefit of settler colonizers themselves, with
little regard for Indigenous aspirations. The Canadian example underscores
the subordination and rejection of Indigenous art when it is framed as more
than a discrete (yet crucial) point of break with the colonial power.
B. CANADA 1927: NATIONAL IDENTITY THROUGH THE ILLEGAL
INDIGENOUS ARTS
In contrast to New Zealand’s engagement with Māori art to cement the
place of Māori and New Zealand as distinctive identities within Empire, the
Canadian history of engagement with Indigenous art is marked by
paternalism, erasure, and the sense of need for direct government support
and intervention on behalf of First Nations.53 It is also problematic in that
telling the history of Indigenous art from the perspective of the colonial
encounter which, while relevant, is not the only nor the key force shaping
the history of Indigenous art.54 Nonetheless, the colonial encounter is
important for present purposes because we are telling a history of the
52. Id. at 139-41.
53. SOLEN ROTH, INCORPORATING CULTURE: HOW INDIGENOUS PEOPLE ARE RESHAPING
THE NORTHWEST COAST ART INDUSTRY 44 (2018).
54. Colette G. St-Onge, Symbols of Authenticity: Challenging the Static Imposition of
Minority Identities Through the Case Study of Contemporary Inuit Art 25 (2002)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Ottawa).
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regulation of Indigenous art to serve emancipatory goals from colonialism.
In this account, to create economic pathways, ‘Indian art’ was bound to a
notion of authenticity that prevented the evolution of Indigenous artistic
production in artists’ own terms. Despite being a key point of interaction of
First Nations with the settler-colonial market, there was little to no
regulation of these transactions and the asymmetries that riddled them (in
fact, regulation sometimes reinforced these asymmetries). Indeed, most of
the little attention paid to Indigenous artistic production was not to the
ways these power relationships operated in the background, but in the uses
of Indigenous art (as art or ethnography) to forge and promote Canadian
national identity.
Against this background, the 1920s was a pivotal moment for the
formation of Canadian cultural identity. Despite Canada having separated
from the United Kingdom in 1867, it struggled to find its distinctive voice
and identity until the period after the First World War.55 The development
of a native Canadian art scene in the 1920s (particularly through the actions
of the Group of Seven, modernist painters – who painted pristine and
Canadian landscapes devoid of Indigenous Canadians) was in full force,
but it needed to be reconciled with Indigenous art to showcase a clearly
distinctive cultural and artistic path.56 In 1927, at the Jeu de Paume in Paris,
Canadian native and Indigenous art were put together in an exhibition on
the same footing, which praised and validated Indigenous art but was less
complimentary of the Group of Seven. This exhibition was important as a
means to underscore the importance and status of Indigenous art alongside
what settler Canadians assumed was the peak of their cultural achievement.
However, the differing levels of recognition abroad led to backlash in the
form of suppression of reviews of the exhibition.57
The belief that Indians were a “dying race” helped cement and
stabilize nationalism.58 For the colonial approach, Indigenous art could be
used to create distinctiveness without necessarily rights to Indigenous
artists or tribes. Canadian politicians and policy-makers deemed the use of
Indigenous art, which “show[ed] the Natives as individuals in possession of
their culture, their regalia, their social structure, their traditions and their
land,” as dangerous to a nationalistic discourse based on a white

55. Leslie Allan Dawn, How Canada Stole the Idea of Native Art: The Group of Seven
and Images of the Indian in the 1920s, 1-2 (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
British Columbia).
56. Id. at 315-316.
57. Id. at ii.
58. Id. at 2.
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narrative.59 Indigenous art was also dangerous in creating an imaginary of
rights for tribal nations that was incompatible with Canadian domestic law
and policy at the time, which even forbade a range of Indigenous artistic
and cultural practices (most notably, the potlatch).60
In a key review of this 1927 exhibition, a reviewer “unaware that the
‘Indians’ were at that moment being erased by these very artists from the
representations of Canada, implied their continued presence as the ancient
and originary volk from which Canadian culture sprang, rather than their
disappearance.” They additionally “declared that in using Native art as a
base, the new Canadian artists had become truly national, citing as a model
the return among contemporary French artists to the art of the middle ages
as more truly French. . . .This assertion flew in the face of the assertion that
the Group [of Seven] sprang from the land without parent, or at most from
an intimate union of Thomson and nature.”61
A version of this 1927 exhibition also toured Canadian cities before
going to Paris. Despite efforts to control the narrative and subsume
Indigenous art into the narrative of a dying culture that produces
ethnographic instead of artistic objects, reactions suggested that Indigenous
art overshadowed the non-Indigenous art. Overall, the exhibition failed in
most cities where it toured, at least as measured in attendance numbers.
Critics were really interested in the Indigenous art on display, almost
entirely dismissing the non-Indigenous pieces.62 In other words, the
exhibition cemented the importance of Indigenous art for Canadian national
identity, but in a way different from the instrumental use the government
expected from it. Crucially, it also fueled the fire of recognition and rights
to land, culture, and resources. Back in Canada, First Nations leveraged
these artistic accolades into greater visibility to their claims.
This exhibition also showcased Indigenous art as “art,” and not
ethnographic artefacts. However, once back in Canada, museums and other
cultural institutions returned Indigenous art “to the category of ethnology
and replaced into the museums where it would remain for the next forty
years, at least insofar as the country’s national institutions went,” with
limited collecting of Indigenous art by national institutions for decades.63
Prior to this 1927 exhibition, however, many First Nations made
claims to Indigenous art with corresponding effects on legal norms.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 315-16.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 311-12.
Id. at 323-24.
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Indigenous cultural production for consumption by non-Indigenous parties
was a thriving industry in crafts, which served primarily economic, rather
than political, objectives. Questions of classification of Indigenous art as
ethnographic or artistic were secondary to the value of Indigenous cultural
production as commodities, and a key business for First Nations.64 That
market for tribal crafts went as far back as the mid-19th century (around the
time of Canadian independence), reaching an important landmark in 1902,
with the formation of the Canadian Handicraft Guild. 65 In other words, the
organization of Indigenous art and artists, while having important symbolic
and political elements (not to mention being a means of practicing culture
and maintaining it),66 had the operation of a market at its core and should
not be pushed to the background of recognition claims. The regulation of
this market is central to making political recognition function beyond any
declaratory act.
As Solen Roth put it, “Canada’s colonial history is filled with
instances of relationships of interdependence going awry, as mutually
profitable exchanges become exploitation.”67 This exploitation happens
both through political mechanisms of erasure–like the dying race
assumption that underpinned the 1927 exhibition–and economic
asymmetries that are legitimized by legal frameworks that tend to elude
analyses of the art market.
The end of the potlatch ban in 1951 highlighted the use of Indigenous
imagery without Indigenous control, but also opened a door for
“Indigenous involvement in and control over such marketing strategies. By
the late twentieth century, the industry had grown considerably. Although it
was still dominated by non-Indigenous stakeholders, it is around this time
that it began to see a steady increase in the level of Indigenous participation
and entrepreneurship.”68 In short, recognition acts are only a relatively
small part of an emancipatory (or colonial) narrative, with more work being
possibly done via private law mechanisms.
Bearing in mind this caveat to the imagined role of recognition, state
patronage can turn into paternalism and fail to disrupt power asymmetries.
In Canada, much artistic production happened through arts education in
residential schools, meant to turn Indigenous persons into lower-class
64. Gerald R. McMaster, Tenuous Lines of Descent: Indian Arts and Crafts of the
Reservation Period, 9(2) CAN. J. NATIVE STUDIES 205, 207 (1999).
65. Id. at 211-15.
66. Canadian Council for the Arts, ARTS & CULTURE IN CANADA FACT SHEET –
CONTEMPORARY INUIT ARTS IN CANADA 3 (2009).
67. Roth, supra note 53, at 20.
68. Id. at 38.
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laborer’s producing crafts.69 Civil society pushed for the inclusion of arts
education and artistic production in schools via a home economics model
that clearly ran contrary to the assimilationist agenda of the government,
and thus met with resistance.70 Nevertheless, the well-meaning
emancipatory goals actually served patronizing and assimilationist ideas
that worked against Indigenous interests.71 Indigenous artworks were
framed as belonging to national heritage, rather than the property of
Indigenous artists themselves, or First Nations.72
Differently to New Zealand, where Māori art and imagery had a past
and was becoming the future, Canadians saw Indigenous art as part of their
nation-making project but did not anticipate or necessitate First Nations in
the nation’s future. Their erasure was assumed both in the exhibition and in
the law around Indigenous cultural manifestations and art production. In
the United States, as we will discuss below, Indigenous art was not part of
a dying Indigenous past like in Canada. But, while sharing a future-oriented
use with New Zealand, it was also a very different type of future. The US
approached Indigenous art as an instrument to advanced assimilation and
authentic distinctiveness through market-oriented legal instrumentalization.
C. UNITED STATES 1939: INDIGENOUS ART FROM “CIVILIZATION” TO
“AUTHENTICITY”
Much like exhibitions in New Zealand and Canada, the Golden Gate
International Exposition 1939-1940 in San Francisco, California promoted
state interests as well as Indian arts. However, there are notable differences
between the United States and the other settler-states we examine. Like
Canada, the United States’ (‘US’) used education to separate students from
families starting in the 1880s, but unlike Canada, the US saw art education
as an important aspect of assimilation. By 1939, the US adopted a very
different approach to law and art based upon the assumed predominance of
the US, as well as an expansion of state-based social welfare programs in
the wake of the great depression.
Late 19th Century US legal policy was unabashedly assimilationist. It
broke up communally-held reservations and transformed them into
privately-held farms through the Dawes Act.73 Almost simultaneously, it
mandated state-based childhood education that removed Indian children
69. Id. at 44.
70. Id. at 47.
71. Id. at 48.
72. Id.
73. General Allotment Act of 1887. This was also known as the Dawes Act or the
Dawes Severalty Act.
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from reservations.74 The US approached art education as “the foundation of
morality, a means for the promotion of virtues and of personal and social
improvement,” and it used art-education to transform “the little ‘savages’
into civilized men and women.”75 The art curriculum, however, provided
Indian pupils with the opportunity to “revive and perpetuate their own
cultural practices,” which led government officials to “reconsider art
education policies.”76 Of course, it is a mistake to think that Indians or
tribes were either passive victims or stalwart opponents of assimilation.77
In the early 20th Century, the American public thought that Indian
people “were considered either fully settled into the habits of a civilized
and productive modern American life, and no longer thought to be ‘Indian,’
or, particularly with respect to those still living on reservations, seen as
unredeemable.”78 By the 1930s, US policies changed as lawmakers
attempted to reverse the damages created through assimilation.79
The 1939 Exposition promoted a vision of Indian arts that reflected
that reversal. No longer “dying or vanishing,” and despite the hardships and
injustices created by the US for Indian Nations, the 1939 Exposition
depicted Indians as “vital and dynamic.”80 Reversing assimilation,
however, intensified legal regulation and commodification of identity and
authenticity in ways that provided the US with more power over tribes. The
1939 Exposition was, in many ways, a result of the New Deal. It was also
marketing for Indian arts and crafts, which promoted the Indian Arts and
Crafts Act 1935 (‘Act’) that was associated with the Indian Reorganization
Act (called the ‘Indian New Deal’). The Indian Reorganization Act halted
allotment and restructured tribal governments as constitutional
democracies.
The Indian Arts and Crafts Act created the Indian Arts and Craft
Board (‘Board’) to “promote the economic welfare of Indian tribes and the

74. DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN INDIANS AND
THE BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE 52 (1995).
75. MARINELLA LENTIS, COLONIZED THROUGH ART: AMERICAN INDIAN SCHOOLS AND
ART EDUCATION, 1889-191 xviii-xix (2017).
76. Id. at xxiv.
77. Julie Davis, American Indian Boarding School Experiences: Recent Studies from
Native Perspectives, 15(2) OAH MAG. OF HIST. 20 (2001), discussing Adams, supra note 74.
78. Lentis, supra note 75, at 256.
79. Brookings Institution, Institute for Government Research: The Problem of Indian
Administration: Report of a Survey Made at the Request of Honorable Hubert Work,
Secretary of the Interior, and Submitted to Him, JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS 17 (Feb. 21, 1928).
80. S.L. Meyn, More than Curiosities: A Grassroots History of the Indian Arts and
Crafts Board and its Precursors, 1920 to 1942, 230, 233 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Cincinnati).
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Indian wards of the Government through the development of Indian arts
and crafts and the expansion of the market for the production of Indian art
and craftsmanship.”81 The Board would create trademarks of “genuineness
and quality for Indian products,”82 as the US obtained prosecution powers
to criminalize counterfeits and imitations without those trademarks.83
Given the supposed demand for authentic Indian art and the willingness of
others to provide fakes,84 the law sought to stabilize Indian ‘authenticity’ so
that individuals identified as Indian (tribes registered with and
acknowledged by the US) could produce “authentic” Indian artifacts for the
consumer market. A Senate Report on the bill noted that “the very
preservation of these products as expressions of Indian life, or as art,
depends upon the market and upon bringing an attractive return to the
maker.”85
From its inception, the Board was obsessed “with defining and
marketing the ideology of authenticity,” which defined and equated
authenticity and “superior quality” with “unbroken links to a primitive
past.”86 General Manager of the Board Rene d’Harnoncourt claimed that
“the more isolated the village, the higher the percentage of quality work.”87
For d’Harnoncourt, the “ever-present link between quality and authentic
craftsmanship by real Indians – those who were most primitive, least
corrupted by the modern industrial world – increased an object’s value in
the high-end market precisely by capitalizing on quality and ethnological
curiosity.”88 Despite changes in policy and law from assimilation to
promotion, underlying racial and paternalistic views were not abolished.
They were transformed.
Accordingly, this Act has been criticized an example of “salvage
81. Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935, S. Res. 2203, 74th Cong., 1 (1935) (enacted).
82. Id. at Section 2; see J.S. Haynes, Constructing Authenticity: The Indian Arts and
Crafts Board and the Easter Band of Cherokees, 1935-1985 3 NATIVE SOUTH at 1, 3, 10-11
(2010).
83. H.R. 3055, ss 5-6.
84. William J. Hapiuk, Jr., Of Kitsch and Kachinas: A Critical Analysis of the Indian
Art and Crafts Act of 1990, 53(4) STAN. L. REV 1009, 1049-50 (2001).
85. Id. at 1050 citing REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS TO
THE HONORABLE HAROLD L ICKES, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, SENATE REPORT 74-900, 6
(1934). See WJ Rushing, Marketing the Affinity of the Primitive and the Modern: Rene
d’Harnoncourt and the “Indian Art of the United States”, THE EARLY YEARS OF NATIVE
AMERICAN ART HISTORY: THE POLITICS OF SCHOLARSHIP AND COLLECTING 191-236 (JC
Berlo ed. 1992).
86. Haynes, supra note 82, at 4.
87. Id at 4, citing Robert Fay Schrader, Indian Arts and Crafts Board: An Aspect of the
New Deal Indian Policy, 200 (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Marquette University).
88. Haynes, supra note 82, at 4-5.
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paradigm:” an attempt to “rescue ‘authenticity’ out of destructive historical
change.”89 For Hapiuk,
“the salvaged objects (or culture itself) that are supposedly saved from
destruction undergo a process of ossification and reification; removed
from context, the contingencies of their existence and their past history
are wiped away. The transformative process creates something quite
“new” in the appropriator’s culture.”90

The Exposition promoted Indian arts and crafts to justify the passage
of the Act and “increase the public’s interest in Indian quality products.”91
Within the Exposition’s Federal Building, approximately one-third of it, or
over an acre and quarter, was dedicated to Indian galleries, a marketplace
and workspace for Indian artists.92 D’Harnoncourt planned and built the
Indian exhibit to be “like an art museum,” and to “capture the public’s
attention,”93 which left the public with the impression that Indian arts were
“a viable genre of art.”94 D’Harnoncourt and Bureau of Indian Affairs
Commissioner John Collier believed that it would help Indians “earn an
income from their sale of the products as well as gain confidence. . .and
self-esteem by working together in a tribal enterprise.”95
Although Indians “did not participate in the exhibit planning phase or
in any decision making related to the exhibit,” d’Harnoncourt made them
visible and they were important behind the scenes.96 Within the exhibit
“Indian artisans assisted in the execution of the large stylized murals for the
exhibit halls and after the exhibited opened Indian artists demonstrated
their skills and gave gallery tours.”97 Indians mostly participated through
producing arts and crafts for sale at the exhibit.98 Given the new Indian Arts
and Crafts Act, non-Indian traders were prohibited from selling “Indian”
arts and crafts, which increased the demand for objects produced by tribal

89. Hapiuk, supra, note 84 at 1045-46 (citing JAMES CLIFFORD, OF OTHER PEOPLES:
BEYOND THE ‘SALVAGE’ PARADIGM, IN DISCUSSIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 121 (Hal
Foster ed., 1987)).
90. Id. at 1046; see also Joseph Traugott, Native American Artists and the Postmodern
Cultural Divide, 51(3) ART. J. 36, 37 (1992).
91. Robert F. Schrader, The Indian Arts and Crafts Board: An Aspect of New Deal
Indian Policy, 304 (April 1981) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Marquette University).
92. Meyn, supra note 80, at 240-1, 254.
93. Id. at 235.
94. Jon K. Parsley, Regulation of Counterfeit Indian Arts and Crafts: An Analysis of the
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 18(2) AM. INDIAN L. REV. 487, 489 (1993).
95. Meyn, supra note 80, at 250; Schrader, supra note 91, at 188.
96. Meyn, supra note 80, at 232.
97. Id. at 264.
98. Id. at 265-6.
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artists while ensuring that d’Harnoncourt’s staff “could control the quality
and guarantee that the market would be free of imitations.” 99 Because the
galleries displayed Indian arts that were borrowed from US museums,
d’Harnoncourt made sure that only high quality arts and crafts were sold in
the market.100 A consequence was that “No attention was paid in this shop
to the tribal origins of the products, and the articles were arranged in such a
manner as to make the individual pieces appear at their best.”101 Similarly,
some of the arts displayed in the galleries were labelled in a “western art
perspective,” meaning that the labels did not contain cultural information of
the communities that produced them.102 Other labels “presented intensive
anthropology lessons.”103
The Exposition’s Indian market was conceived as “an experimental
sales and display laboratory,” a “testing grounds for the future
merchandising of Indian arts and crafts.”104 This experiment in
marketisation immediately ran aground of US law as well as the problems
that US law had created for tribes. One problem was that the Board could
not deal in Indian arts and crafts because the Indian Arts and Crafts Act
prevented any non-Indian organization from “borrowing, lending, or
dealing in Indian Artifacts.”105 To get around this limitation, Collier
solicited cooperation from those tribes to lend pieces for sale on
consignment at the market.106 This arrangement shifted the burden of
problem-solving to Indian artists and tribes, which needed financing to
produce high quality arts and crafts to be sold at the Exposition. Tribes that
had adopted the Indian Reorganization Act could access credit or apply for
loans, but others had to seek funding elsewhere.107 While the law had been
designed to create a market, the market became a means for promoting the
law to join the market.
This Exposition shows that by the 1930s, US law made the consumer
market the primary tool of establishing distinctive identity for Indian
Nations’ to “claim their rightful place in American society” as it preserved,
and perhaps ossified, their “authentic” identities. The US sought to promote
Indian arts and Indian authenticity, as commodified objects within its
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at 267.
Schrader, supra note 91, at 295-6
Meyn, supra note 80, at 260-1.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 268-69.
Id.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 269-70.
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expanding empire. However, the 1939 Exposition shows that the legal
commodification of distinct national identities through arts and objects can
support the empire, and from the US’s perspective, strengthened their
claims over its subjects.
After World War II, the language of self-determination arose from an
anti-colonial, anti-imperial and anti-capitalist movement in international
law, but would lose much of its anti-imperialist potential after the 1970s.108
The Australian example below shows the intersection of Indigenous art and
its legal regulation with the international legal-political language of selfdetermination. Accordingly, attempting to use state law, like intellectual
property, or international legal language, like self-determination, can
support the (re)formation distinct Indigenous identities or claims to distinct
national identities. However, doing so is not separate from prior forms of
imperialism or state formation. Instead, using law to (re)form claims about
authenticity to regulate the excesses of the international art market is
consonant with prior legal and formations of market-based imperialism.
D. AUSTRALIA 1988: INTERNATIONAL PRAISE TO LEVERAGE
DOMESTIC RECOGNITION
In the late twentieth century, Australians proactively engaged with
Indigenous art as part of its national project. Like other countries in our
analysis, Australia tapped into the power of Indigenous art to create a
distinctive, post-colonial identity for its white settler population, with
relatively little benefit planned specifically for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples. The recognition of the power and artistic significance of
Indigenous art outside of Australia, however, lent momentum to Indigenous
recognition pushes within Australia itself. This momentum worked in the
direction of quickly individualizing the rights of Indigenous artists and
grounding them on intellectual property (IP) law, a move that, while
offering an easily accessible and enforceable rights framework, is made
less so by many carve-outs for Indigenous culture which render the
inclusionary potentials of IP law ultimately hollow, counter-productive, or
exclusionary.
Indigenous cultural tourism has long been an important part of how
Australia defined itself to the world, both prior to and especially after the
1967 referendum that included Indigenous peoples in the Australian legal
order.109 This initial recognition move lent greater impetus to the
108. ROLAND BURKE, DECOLONIZATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS (2010).
109. Jennifer Craik, Tourism, Culture and National Identity, CULTURE IN AUSTRALIA:
POLICIES, PUBLICS AND PROGRAMS 89, 91 (Tony Bennett & David Carter eds., 2001).
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exploration of Indigenous art not just as a pre-existing resource for the
tourist gaze, but also could be produced specifically for the art market.
Geoffrey Bardon is referred to as a pioneer in engaging with Indigenous
artists for the benefit of understanding and showcasing Indigenous culture
and introducing the technique of acrylic painting on canvas that is a staple
of contemporary Australian Indigenous art.110 Commercial interests soon
followed, and arguably disrupted the emancipatory potential of Indigenous
art by setting aside the performance of identity in favor of catering to an
incipient art market.111 Specifically, artists were accused of no longer
producing ‘authentic’ Indigenous art and instead catering to consumer
interests.112 This accusation is, in our view, problematic, inasmuch as it
encases Indigenous art in an ‘authentic’ realm defined by an outsider
(Bardon), denying Indigenous peoples their cultural self-determination. It is
also our contention that claims to self-determination can be problematic for
ossifying authenticity within a language that is open to re-appropriation and
contestation.
Paternalism was a strong theme in the legal treatment of Indigenous
art from the government’s perspective, even though Indigenous artists
themselves saw their art as a self-determination move and a means to
engage with and make sense of colonialism.113 As Fred Myers put it,
“[a]crylic painting should be reckoned on a continuum or Aboriginal
productions of culture that we would ultimately understand as forms of
activism within a multicultural context.”114
Because self-determination in the 1980s was connected to a politically
charged struggle for land rights (which were only recognized in 1992), 115
Indigenous art did not enjoy a particularly high status at home. Indigenous
artists were treated as unskilled laborers,116 and only praise in international
art centers like Paris and New York seemed to jolt the Australian public
into awareness of the value of Indigenous art.117 When international
recognition filtered back into Australia, difficult questions of justice to be
sidestepped. “Australians felt a sense of cultural ownership with the
110. Bronwyn Coate, A Comparative Study of Australian Indigenous and NonIndigenous Art, 3 (unpublished manuscript) (held on file).
111. John Oster, Proposal for a Regulated Indigenous Art Industry, 6(18) INDIGENOUS L.
BULL. 21 (2006).
112. Id.
113. FRED R. MYERS, PAINTING CULTURE: THE MAKING OF AN ABORIGINAL HIGH ART
148 (2002).
114. Id. at 5.
115. Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.).
116. Myers, supra note 111, at 186.
117. Id. at 230.
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popularity of Aboriginal art but were reluctant to ask the difficult questions
about the conditions in which these works were produced.”118 In other
words, the effect of recognition via the international gaze overlooked issues
regarding the legal treatment of individual artists. It served the collective
cause of self-determination well (after all, international recourse is a staple
of self-determination movements), but it left the legal frameworks affecting
individual artists (whether as foreground or background norms) unattended.
Further, the use of Indigenous art for the benefit of the Australian
nation was, like in other countries, tied to practices of borrowing and
appropriation by non-Indigenous artists also involved in nation-making
through the arts. In Australia, modernist painter Margaret Preston called for
artists to be inspired by Indigenous art practices and adopt Indigenous
motifs as background in their works. Her calls went unheeded (but not
rejected) at the time, and later she was nonetheless accused of cultural
appropriation.119 Despite this backlash, it is clear that “[a]ffirmation and
appropriation thus went hand in hand.”120
Against this background, the 1988 touring exhibition Dreamings: The
Art of Aboriginal Australia generated “excitement surrounding this new art
market phenomenon, [where] art enthusiasts conscientiously tried to
unravel the symbolism of Aboriginal art.”121 It was partly led by the South
Australia Museum in Adelaide and the Aboriginal Commission of
Australia.122 Like the 1939 San Francisco Exposition discussed in the
previous section, this exhibition sought to present Indigenous art as
sophisticated contemporary art, and to dispel assumptions about Indigenous
art as “primitive,” or of only ethnographic value.123 Indigenous art in this
exhibition was lauded for being “sophisticated, complex, extremely
coherent and immensely accurate in its presentation of all that is the
essence of being Aboriginal,”124 as well as for its “timeless cultural

118. Ruth Rentschler and Mirko Bagaric, The Indigenous Art Market: A Roadmap to a
More Equitable and Efficient System, 6(4) INDIGENOUS L. BULL. 11 (2004).
119. Coate, supra note 110, at 2.
120. Nicholas Thomas, Indigenous Presences and National Narratives in Australasian
Museums, CULTURE IN AUSTRALIA: POLICIES, PUBLICS AND PROGRAMS 299, 301 (Tony
Bennett & David Carter eds., 2001).
121. PEARL DUNCAN AND JIM PORTER, Review of ‘DREAMINGS: THE ART OF ABORIGINAL
AUSTRALIA, 12(2) ABORIGINAL HIST. 199 (Peter Sutton eds., 1988).
122. Francine Farr, DREAMINGS: THE ART OF ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIA, 22(3) AFRICAN
ARTS 84 (1989).
123. LUKE TAYLOR, DREAMINGS: THE ART OF ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIA, 12(2)
ABORIGINAL HIST. 41, 42 (Peter Sutton eds., 1988).
124. JIM PORTER, DREAMINGS: THE ART OF ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIA, 12 (2) ABORIGINAL
HIST. 201 (Peter Sutton eds., 1988).
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sophistication,”125 and for being “a vital, even avant-garde art.”126
The exhibition itself, and its accompanying catalogue, were praised
for being “the first extended overview of the history of Aboriginal art
scholarship,” “a substantial analysis of the Aboriginal aesthetic which
reveals how it is integrated with the distinctive world view and social
values of Aboriginal traditions,” an analysis of “the cultural, economic and
political contexts of the production of Western Desert paintings for
Australia and world art markets,” and, crucially, for refuting “the popular
assumption held by non-Aborigines that Aboriginal culture and society
would decline rapidly to extinction.”127 The exhibition was also praised for
being “a milestone for Australian Aboriginal art and a coming-of-age in the
representation of peoples of color. The recognition of the increasingly
conspicuous role of native peoples in the domestic control and international
circulation of their art was the driving force behind this exhibition,” which
“succeeded in informing of the past and ennobling the future through a
careful balance of present realities.”128 In other words, this exhibition
portrayed to the world the artistic achievement of Aboriginal artists, as well
as claims to self-determination and other rights Aboriginal art and artists
were politicized through law in ways that other exhibitions did not, a move
likely possible because the exhibition was held outside of Australia, and
riding the wave of the Indigenous land rights movement occurring
domestically and internationally.
One of the reviews, in the Smithsonian magazine, praised Indigenous
art’s “persistence of vision [which] is maintained through collective
enterprise,”129 thus highlighting collective achievements of the artworks
over individual artists’. At least one other reviewer also criticized the lack
of individualization of the art and the artists in favor of broader
contextualization of the artistic tradition.130 In this way, like with other
exhibitions we analyze here, Dreamings served to galvanize entirety of
Indigenous art at the expense of the artists. Although the move to broader
recognition was important in its own terms, it had detrimental impacts on
the rights of artists, thereby compromising the very art these critics seek to
elevate. Artists used the art market and Dreamings “to resist the wholesale

125. Farr, supra note 122, at 84.
126. Michael Dirda, DREAMINGS: THE ART OF ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIA, 19 SMITHSONIAN
183 (Peter Sutton eds., 1988).
127. Duncan, supra note 121, at 200.
128. Farr, supra note 122, at 84.
129. Dirda, supra note 126, at, 200.
130. Taylor, supra note 123, at 43.
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incorporation of their culture,”131 and therefore the paternalistic assumption
that they should be excluded from the market, which has direct effects on
the rights of artists (by assuming they are secondary or should be subject to
stringent state supervision) needs to be problematized and eliminated in
regulatory projects.
Today, Indigenous artists are a much larger proportion of the market
in Australian art than they are a proportion of the population.132 Because of
the higher value of Indigenous art compared to proportion of population,
art is a key economic source for Aboriginal peoples compared to the rest of
the population.133 That said, Indigenous art does not fetch the same average
prices as non-Indigenous art at auction.134 While male non-Indigenous
artists command better prices than women, there is near parity in prices
across genders with Indigenous art, suggesting that indigeneity eclipses
gender as a marker of cultural value for buyers.135 The relative overrepresentation of Indigenous artists can also lend the impression that the
1988 exhibition was too successful: it elevated Indigenous art and selfdetermination to the point where allegedly no specific or strong legal
protection is needed. Debates in Australia have focused on resale rights as a
subset of the artist’s IP rights over their creations, which is an important
means of leveraging economic benefit in favor of Indigenous artists. That
said, much discourse in Australia in this area involves “periods of legal
exclusion and legal inclusion of indigenous art from the ambit of the
Copyright Act with reference to wider socio-cultural values and political
developments,” revealing “a double movement [that] characterizes the
intersection between Australia’s copyright law and wider society: a
dialogic of inclusion and exclusion. This double movement of inclusion
and exclusion is dynamic and yet constant in its ultimate withdrawal from
acknowledging indigenous cultural difference in a meaningful way.”136
This double movement “can be understood as a movement of inclusion that
is ultimately undone by its exclusionary elements.”137
This Australian exhibition, alongside those in Canada, New Zealand,
and the United States, shine a light on the uses of Indigenous art and
Indigeneity to pursue nationalist projects, which often occurred without

131. Id. at 45.
132. Coate, supra note 110, at 8.
133. Id. at 14.
134. Id. at 8.
135. Id. at 11-2.
136. Marie Hadley, The Double Movements That Define Copyright Law and Indigenous
Art in Australia, 9(1) INDIGENOUS L. J. at 47-9 (2010).
137. Id. at 50.
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significant regard for Indigenous views and interests. They also show how
Indigenous peoples have sought to tap into these exhibitions and associated
legal frameworks to pursue their own causes despite them being objects
instead of subjects of the law. These exhibitions and the legal contexts
around them also show that it is not enough to rely on specific legal
frameworks that directly address Indigenous art. There are myriad
interactions between Indigenous artists and settler actors in the arts and
cultural sector that often evade or undermine self-determination or other
emancipatory efforts. In other words, these exhibitions show that in the
connections between Indigenous art and their regulation on the one hand,
and Indigenous goals on the other, the current analytical foci have
insufficiently grappled with some of the legal mechanisms at work. A
research agenda is needed to expose the colonial violence, and unearth the
emancipatory potential, of art and art law in Indigenous contexts. The next
section offers an articulation and roadmap of such a research agenda.

III. BREAKING THE CYCLE? A RESEARCH AGENDA
Indigenous objects have not always been categorized as ‘art.’
However, those objects and images became important and useful in
forming discrete national identities that supported the formalizations of the
nation-state. When formalizing boundaries, first as colonies and then as
states, the state-based legal regime can formally recognize and (re)produce
the category of art as applicable to Indigenous art-objects. The increasing
formalization of state law then discursively produces the conditions for
commodification of these art-objects as well as identities, in terms of
claims to an ‘authentic self’ and national-identities for the nation-state and
Indigenous nations.
Having tapped into the insight of critical legal scholars, the four case
studies suggest that law–whether private or public, or an international law
based on common law imperialism–did not lag behind a market for
Indigenous arts and crafts. It constituted that market as well as national
identities which, then, discursively shape the law. Therefore, we suggest
that those who advocate for a turn to national or international legal regimes,
especially forms of private law–like IP or copyright–for the better
regulation and promotion of Indigenous artists’ rights will not fully resolve
the following issues. Instead, (re)turning to law ensures that so-called
excesses of the marketplace will remain fruitful areas of legal contestation.
The remainder of this section identifies some of these issues of legality and
co-production that should animate further necessary research into the
regulation of Indigenous art.
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A. INDIGENOUS PRODUCTIONS AS ART OR ETHNOLOGY
Indigenous peoples have always prized objects, and some
anthropologists and lawyers have considered those objects artefacts, not art.
The Exhibitions demonstrate how that notion has changed. First, Māori
performances and objects were staged in Araiteuru. Later, Canada placed
Indigenous arts-objects next to non-Indigenous arts in Canada, and the US
staged Indian arts like a museum. In the 1980s, the South Australia
Museum and the Aboriginal Commission of Australia brought Aboriginal
art to an international audience in support of Indigenous self-determination.
Through this broad trajectory, art was alienated from the body as law
became central to authenticity and self-identification. However, tensions
between art and artefact persist–the exhibitions reveal the need to establish
Indigenous arts as art in opposition to artefacts. It indicates that even if
Indigenous peoples had valuable and prized objects, that does not
necessarily make them “art.” The categorization of art is contentious and
interdisciplinary tensions among anthropology, law, art history, and
Indigenous peoples’ views fall short of stabilizing the category.
For instance, anthropologists and historians have concluded, in
various ways and according to their disciplines, that “primitive tribes
decorative art for its own sake does not exist”138 or that “Māori ‘art’ was
produced through the colonial culture of display.”139 There are, of course,
counter-claims that these “arts” were not fabricated.140 While those two
positions might otherwise agree on quite a bit, it is clear that Indigenous or
native peoples had prized possession and at some later point associated
with a colonial-project those objects were included within dynamic
category of “art.” Indigenous art-like objects that pre-date that categorical
shift, or subsequently produced art-objects in the style of pre-colonial
categorization become “traditional.” When that occurs, it relates to and
contributes to discussions about the colonial role in “producing” those
objects as “traditional.”141 The constitution of these categories then become
tied up in questions about authenticity. Whether traditions are authentic in
fact or are “authentic” for the demands of a consumer, and whether those
are the same thing, is contested.142

138. Barbara E. Milimine, Art, Identity and Culture: The Politicization of Contemporary
Northwest Coast First Nations Art 39 (2006) (unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of
Northern British Columbia) (manuscript held on file), citing Franz Boaz, THE MIND OF
PRIMITIVE MAN 217 (1983).
139. McCarthy, supra note 34, at 46.
140. St-Onge, supra note 54, at 26.
141. Milmine, supra note 138, at 45, 111.
142. Id. at 41.
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Here, we note that the more anyone claims to have a “true account,”
the deeper and more personal the contest seems. Recourse to law, whether
invoking self-determination as an international legal concept or IP laws of
state, does not resolve these issues. Instead, law becomes an area for
contesting claims and disciplinary differences.
B. RECOGNITION OF PEOPLES
When it is claimed that colonial contact is what “produces” or
“invents” “traditions” in opposition to “modernity” (stemming from the
notion that the category of “art” is externally imposed on Indigenous
individuals and communities), it inflects what recognition of peoples is or
might be. Recognition as peoples can have multiple and different
meanings, but to the degree it stems from international legal claims to selfdetermination it holds out the promise that peoples can “freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.”143 In each of the case studies, even if the language of “selfdetermination” is not used, the state promotes Indigenous art as part of its
national identity. State promotion can both help and hinder Indigenous
peoples’ self-determination. If a separate or sui generis legal regime for the
protection of Indigenous arts were to be created, it might be seen as
reinforced “(yet again) Indigenous Otherness” but help acknowledge their
unique position within contemporary state formations.144 A sui generis
regime could draw attention to the uniqueness of Indigenous ways that
contribute to greater “respect for Indigenous laws and economic
principles.”145 It might create conditions for authentic claims to selfdetermination.
In addition to (re)producing conditions for claims to authenticity, nonIndigenous values might come to influence Indigenous values. An art
market “is progressively being infused with [Indigenous] approaches to
property, relationships, and economics that directly reflect the histories and
cultures of the [Canadian] Northwest Coast’s Indigenous peoples” 146 but
may simultaneously raise “questions of cultural appropriation and
exploitation, even when it involves willing and active Indigenous
participants.”147 When questions of appropriation and exploitation are
viewed as issues related to culture and market, rather than as produced as
143. UN G.A. Res 1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960).
144. Natalie Stoianoff & Alpana Roy, Indigenous Knowledge and Culture in Australia –
The Case for Sui Generis Legislation, 41(3) MONASH UNIV L. REV. 745, 782 (2015).
145. Roth, supra note 53, at 5.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 12.
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an issue of and for legal contestation, renewed critical focus on authenticity
arises.148 Again, the double-movement of colonialism arises: working with
the state can be viewed as furthering colonialism or assimilationism, while
highlighting structural dimensions undercuts that agency, an
inclusionary/exclusionary matrix.
C. ASSIMILATIONISM
Some states pursued assimilation through force, like removing
children from reservations and placing them in white homes. But
assimilation can be pursued through non-forceful means (assuming a
distinction between force and non-force, violence and non-violence, or
coercion and non-coercion). Each exhibition revealed a preconceived
conceptual distinction between Indigenous and non-Indigenous or white
and Indian/Aboriginal/Māori. With those conceptual distinctions, any
practices or regulation that are exclusionary might be discriminatory while
inclusionary practices may be assimilative – a double-movement based
upon an inclusion/exclusion matrix that is itself exclusionary.149 Similarly,
the binary between authentic and inauthentic or fake presupposes the
existence of a real and authentic pre-existing identity that could be
excluded or included and, with the binary, those who are consider not-fully
authentic fall out of the picture.150 The discourses surrounding authenticity
produce the struggles for and against authentic art and essentialist
identities.151
Art can be the “primary platform” for Indigenous communities to
present and negotiate identity, which states have also used to cultivate
national identities.152 States’ intervention in Indigenous artistic production
raises questions about the state’s appropriation of that identity, which
within the colonial context re-triggers questions about the “invention” of
tradition and identity. Throughout appropriation and invention of identities,
legality is direct implicated. The role of the state as a patron and promoter
of art showcases the powerful role of the law. But focusing on law as a
solution to these problems shifts our focus to the subject-matter of law–
legal capacity, individual and collective rights, and so on. Doing so tends to
ignore the constitutive force of law in producing market, state, and claims
to national identity and its “Others.”
148. Milmine, supra note 138, at 45, 111
149. Marie Hadley, The Double Movements That Define Copyright Law and Indigenous
Art in Australia, 9(1) INDIGENOUS L. J. 47, 49 (2010).
150. Id. at 51-2.
151. St-Onge, supra note 54, at 52-3, 102.
152. Id. at 105, 111.
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D. STATE PATRONAGE
State patronage arises when states and state actors play a role in the
promotion of Indigenous arts. Where the state or state-actors attempt to
save or “salvage” pre-contact “primitive” art from the ravages of
modernity,153 it can trigger claims of “invention” of tradition or identity,
which were reflected through the exhibitions. Hamilton in New Zealand
and d’Harnoncourt in the United States promoted, respectively, Māori and
Indian arts to the public and for the public identification. When state actors
promote, advocate and patron Indigenous artists, scholars–primarily
anthropologists–have said that those individuals “used” those artists or
“invented” those traditions.154 That state patronage is not necessarily
implicated in the same way for non-Indigenous artists reveals an orientalist
discourse: non-Indigenous artists are the state while Indigenous artists
belong to the state.
While state actors have typically promoted Indigenous arts to the
public and may intend it helping to building nation identities (for the state
and the tribe), the ability to promote Indigenous artists may rely on or
contribute to the development of IP laws to facilitate marketization.155
While one might believe that the IP realm has always existed or pre-existed
Indigenous artists, the inclusion of Indigenous artists within state legal
regimes changes the state, its legal regimes as well as the artists. IP for
Indigenous arts can elucidate previously excluded domains but bringing
within the ambit of the state as somehow different can also re-assert
difference as inferiority.156 Assertions of difference affect the state, and in
fact help create it and Indigenous artists. Where a state promotes
Indigenous artists, those promotions raise reputations domestically and
internationally.157 When Indigenous art is closely associated with national
identity, the promotion of the art can devalue art and artists while

153. France Trépanier and Chris Creighton-Kelly, Understanding Aboriginal Arts in
Canada Today: A Knowledge and Literature Review Prepared for the Research and
Evaluation Section of the Canada Council for the Arts 46 (2011) (unpublished manuscript)
(held on file); Hapiuk, supra note 84.
154. McCarthy, supra note 36; Jonaiti, 27; also W. Jackson Rushing, Critical Issues in
Recent Native American Art, 51 ART J. 6, 7 (1992); also Allan Hanson, The Making of
Maori: Culture Invention and its Logic’, 91(4) AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 849, 890 (1989).
155. Colin Golvan, Aboriginal Art and the Public Domain, 9 J. L. & INFO. SCI. 122
(1998).
156. Hadley, supra note 150, at 60.
157. TOM ACKER, SOMEWHERE IN THE WORLD: ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT
ISLANDER ART AND ITS PLACE IN THE GLOBAL ART MARKET 7 (CRC-REP Research Report
CR017, 2016).
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enhancing social capital in nationalist identities. 158
E. INDIVIDUAL VERSUS GROUP RIGHTS
When artists represent communally held “traditional cultural
expressions and knowledge” as art-objects, state-based IP and copyright
regimes do not adequately deal with the communal or collective nature of
those rights.159 This gap is often expressed in domestic and international
law as a tension between individual and collective rights.160 This tension,
however, applies differently to Indigenous and non-Indigenous artists, in a
way that “others” Indigenous artistic production and subsumes it into a
collective paradigm ripe for capture by nation-building projects.
The common law can apply flexibly to Indigenous contexts. For
example, judges can apply fiduciary relationships between Indigenous
artists and the clan or tribal community when there is that relationship.161
British common law in this sense becomes the mode and method of
expressing that relationship. Conversely, the framing can also recognize
that Indigenous normative orders (and laws) can be given effect through the
common law to recognize Indigenous authority over a work, “irrespective
of who held the brush.”162 However, that authorship can be ascribed to an
individual when the piece has been produced collectively is wellrecognized within the “Western” tradition,163 and does not risk negating the
possibility of legal protection for non-Indigenous artists. In other words,
non-Indigenous individual authorship over collective works is resolved
through ascribing a simple individual right, whereas in the Indigenous
context it is spoken instead in a register of collective rights that is harder to
enforce.
Further, when authorship is attributed, it helps makes the object
“authentic,” giving rise to legal problems when the attribution is false or
158. Id. at 11.
159. Stoianoff, supra note 144; JESSICA C. LAI, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: LEARNING FROM THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE? 59-208
(2014).
160. JESSIKA EICHLER, RECONCILING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE
RIGHTS: PARTICIPATION, PRIOR CONSULTATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN LATIN
AMERICA (2019).
161. Colin Golvan, The Protection of “At The Waterhole” by John Bulun Bulun –
Aboriginal art and the recognition of private and communal rights, 80 INTELL. PROP. F.: J.
OF THE INTELL. AND INDUS. PROP. SOC’Y OF AUSTL. & N.Z. 38 (2010).
162. Tania Johnson, When is a Forgery not a Forgery?, 6 J. OF INDIGENOUS POL’Y 83, 87
(2006) (footnotes omitted).
163. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., INDIGENOUS VISUAL ARTS AND CRAFTS SECTOR, S.
STANDING COMM. ON ENV’T, COMMC’N, INFO. TECH. & THE ARTS, INDIGENOUS ART –
SECURING THE FUTURE, at p. 8.12-8.13 (2007).

Winter 2021

INDIGENOUS ARTISTS AND THE LAW

35

inauthentic.164 And, as we saw above, authenticity has played a significant
role in the development of state legal regimes for the regulation and
promotion of tribal arts and crafts. The battle over “authenticity” suggests,
however, that focusing on tensions between individual and collective rights
presupposes a distinction between Indigenous “Others” and national
identity. It also presupposes that the national identity of the state was
formed or made without regard for the Indigenous Others. The ability of a
legal regimes to facilitate individual or collective rights, while keeping that
distinction relevant, obfuscates that the collective national identity was
constructed through the inclusion of Others. The use of state-based
copyright or IP for Indigenous artists then maintains the imperial formation
of the state, and its civilizing mission, by either shoehorning the “Other”
into state structures or carving out an exception that purportedly respects
Indigenous identity, but in order to do so essentializes Indigeneity to the
point of rendering the law opaque, thereby othering Indigeneity in ways
that render collective rights meaningless.
F. CONNECTION BETWEEN INDIGENEITY AND NATIONALISM
In the exhibitions, states promoted Indigenous authenticity to cultivate
their own distinct national identities. For instance, in our first example
about New Zealand, Hamilton sought to memorialize and salvage Māori
motifs for a national identity.165 Similarly, in Australia Bardon promoted
Aboriginal artists’ use of acrylics, which became a well-known form of
Australian Indigenous art.166 We have considered exhibitions because they
are illustrative of larger trends, hopes and themes. They also reveal that the
colonies and domains of the British Empire and, later, states relied on
Indigenous images/motifs to make themselves distinct from the British
Empire. As they formed distinct identities, they solidified jurisdictional and
territorial control, which, as the US demonstrates, creates a sense of self
and responsibility to their own empires.167 Within each of these states
today, “Indigenous cultural themes are used extensively in tourism
promotion, for example, and indigenous art has been exhibited and artists
celebrated internationally.”168 Where distinctive Indigenous artistic images
aids in the creation of a nation-state identity that is separate from Europe,

164. Johnson, supra note 163 at 97-8.
165. McCarthy, supra note 34.
166. Coate, supra note 110 at 3.
167. See also Antony Anghie, Race, Self-Determination and Australian Empire, 19
MELB. J. OF INT’L L. 423 (2018).
168. JENNIFER CRAIK, RE-VISIONING ARTS AND CULTURAL POLICY: CURRENT IMPASSES
AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 41-5 (2007).
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the formation of national-state identity and the desire for distinctiveness
can only arise when there is an international ordering, whether an imperial
formation or an international legal ordering of states. The states remake and
reproduce empire through the extension of their jurisdictional borders and
their turn to British common law, as states claim the Other as internal to
themselves.
Similarly, the formation and solidification of the national-state identity
and boundaries can produce a desire amongst Indigenous individuals and
communities for recognition as distinct from the state–a recognition as
peoples with self-determination discussed above. In the same way that the
formation of nation-states requires the establishment and formalization of
jurisdictional boundaries, Indigenous peoples can uphold their imagery and
arts to promote distinctive identities as nations. This recognition does not
deny that many tribes had spatial/temporal claims associated with political
formations that pre-exist colonial contact. Instead, it points to the formative
role of law or the international law of self-determination as a new feature in
(re)creating those boundaries between self and European or self and Other.
Distinctive Indigenous artistic images can help create a tribal national
identity that is separate from the nation-state. The formation of a tribal
national identity and the desire for distinctiveness from the nation-state or
Europeans can only arise when there is some sort of (inter)national
ordering. So even if a tribe had pre-colonial claims to land and political
formations, tribal nations that remake its self-identification in opposition to
Europe or the nation-state centralize law while reproducing it.
G. KNOWLEDGE CREATION AND POWER ASYMMETRIES
Again, Indigenous individuals and communities have always
possessed prized article and objects. The ability to produce those objects,
display them and sell them can produce senses of identity as well as
sources of income. However, Indigenous artists have identified problems
with the marketplace that are not about identity or market. Instead,
knowledge created and deployed through colonial-Indigenous encounters
produced “Indigenous” in opposition to colonists, which made both,
including “Indigenous” subjects of disciplinary expert knowledge.169 When
issues arise from the production of knowledge/power, there are reasons to
believe that invoking a disciplinary knowledge of colonial construction,
like the state’s legal frameworks, will re-entrench the problems.170 While
169. Kathy Bowrey, Economic Rights, Culture Claims and a Culture of Piracy in the
Indigenous Art Market: What Should We Expect from the Western Legal System?, 13(2)
AILR 35, 35 (2009); Hadley, supra note 150, at 68.
170. Id. at 35.
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lawyers and government officials may view the problems of Indigenous
artists in terms of market failures or a misapplied legal, this way of
thinking may make it more difficult to recognize broader or foundational
problems stemming from the colonial production of knowledge as an
ongoing exercise of power creation.171 As Kathy Bowrey writes, turning to
national or international IP laws for Indigenous cultural products could
“and should serve political reconciliation–affirming culture
and identity and establishing new entitlements of post-colonial
Indigenous citizenship. What is held out as a political and legal
possibility is the future development of laws that appropriately
reflect Indigenous perspectives and cultural identity. This is
incredibly problematic.”172
For Bowrey, the legality and the marketplace remains
un(der)interrogated but central in reproducing discrimination and
disadvantage.173 Even if a legal regime were to create sui generis rights for
Indigenous arts, it would (re)produce differences that fail to interrogate
power dynamics while upholding the status quo and a “range of
discriminatory practices and burdens that the ‘norm’ is not expected to
entertain to the same degree.”174 If we are right that law was (at least
partially) productive of demand for Indigenous arts, and that demand
discursively constructed the law, then using law to constrain market
excesses is bound to reproduce the problems that it seeks to solve.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Understanding Indigenous art through anthropology or law is use of
knowledge. It works from a way of understanding the world (as already
abstracted) towards a subject (that is supposedly concrete). We have
adopted the view that the legal regulation of Indigenous art is a fruitful but
un(der)explored space–particularly in terms articulating how empire and
international law are reproduced in terms of national identities and state
formation. We seek to challenge the notion that law needs to catch up to a
global market, because law is constitutive of the conditions and
contingencies of that market. We do not suggest that our inquiry is outside
of imperial construction; rather, we suggest that legal knowledge is central
to its reproduction.
There is a need for additional international and comparative focus on
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 52.
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this issue because the formalization of state boundaries reveals that
employing legal frameworks for directly addressing and protecting
Indigenous artists or Indigenous art has produced inter-disciplinary debates
and contests involving many issues discussed here. These debates include
whether Indigenous objects are art or artefact; the role of art and
recognition of peoples as opposed to assimilation; the role of state
patronage in preserving and producing “authenticity;” the legal capacity of
arts; individual or collective rights, commodification, identity, and
nationality. We discuss each in short without suggesting that we can or will
try to solve these debates. Instead, they are evidence of a result of a legal
regime that ensures these issues will not be fully resolved. The legal
regimes narrow a dizzying array of potentially inchoate tensions to an
apparently legitimate terrain upon which they become areas of contestation,
rather than becoming solved, fixed, or permanently stabilized.

